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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF WEAPONIZED DRONES:
TODAY AND TOMORROW

INTRODUCTION
What do children, adults, photographers, farmers, utilities, agriculture, oil
and manufacturing companies, and law enforcement have in common? They
all asked for a drone for Christmas. In fact, the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) became concerned in October of 2015 with reports of
at least one million Americans likely to find a drone under the tree on
Christmas morning. 1 However, one of these things is not like the other. While
children, adults, farmers, and companies are using drones to monitor their own
activities, law enforcement agencies are using drones to monitor the activities
of others. 2 While a step in the right direction for those concerned with the
safety of our police officers, some see this as a platform for constitutional
issues. 3 Amongst these varying points of view are residents of North Dakota,
where a bill was passed with the intention to enumerate and limit law
enforcement’s use of drones. 4 However, after a close reading of the finalized
bill, the text itself may actually expand law enforcement’s use of drones, rather
than limit it. 5
North Dakota passed House Bill 1328 into law on April 16, 2015, which
“provide[s] for limitations on the use of unmanned aircraft for surveillance.” 6
The purpose of the act was to restrict law enforcement’s use of drones for
surveillance efforts in the collection of criminal evidence. 7 Along with these

1. Dan Reed, A Million Drones for Christmas? FAA Frets the Threat for Planes, FORBES
(Oct. 1, 2015, 7:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/2015/10/01/drones-faa-christ
mas/#11290e663f27 [https://perma.cc/F4SV-Y8LY].
2. Domestic Drones, AM. C. L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/
surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones [https://perma.cc/DT3Y-QLPB].
3. Eyragon Eidam, Reports on North Dakota Weaponized Drone Law Miss Larger Picture,
GOV’T. TECH. (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Reports-on-North-DakotaWeaponized-Drone-Law-Miss-Larger-Picture.html [https://perma.cc/X6XS-7BXQ].
4. Marco della Cava, Police Taser Drones Authorized in N.D., USA TODAY (Aug. 29,
2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/08/28/police-Taser-drones-authorized
—north-dakota/71319668/ [https://perma.cc/558X-NVBC].
5. Id.
6. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. 2015).
7. Justin Glawe, First State Legalizes Taser Drones for Cops, Thanks to a Lobbyist, THE
DAILY BEAST (Aug. 26, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/26/
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efforts, the original proposed bill included the language, “A state agency may
not authorize the use of, including granting a permit to use, an unmanned
aircraft armed with any lethal or nonlethal weapons, including firearms, pepper
spray, bean bag guns, mace, and sound-based weapons.” 8 However, after
transformations by fellow lawmakers, the bill now reads, “[a] law enforcement
agency may not authorize the use of, including granting a permit to use, an
unmanned aerial vehicle armed with any lethal weapons.” 9 Although the North
Dakota bill’s purpose was to decrease law enforcement’s use of drones in
criminal situations, after revisions, it now inadvertently allows the use of “nonlethal” weapons, such as pepper spray, tear gas, Tasers, beanbag guns, or
sound cannons to be mounted on drones. 10 This is a win for some, but is
concerning for others as implications of the legislation would give law
enforcement the ability to incapacitate suspects from miles away. 11
As a St. Louis native, student at Saint Louis University School of Law, and
prior law clerk at Emerson Electric, Co., located in Ferguson, Missouri, this
kind of police power is particularly interesting to me. It gives rise to the
question of how the dynamic of the riots, which occurred in Ferguson in
August and November of 2014, would have been changed had Missouri police
officers been allowed to use drones armed with “non-lethal” weapons.
In this paper, I aim to explore the positive or negative implications of a
similar bill being passed in Missouri by exploring the history leading up to this
point and current advances in this area of law. To do so, Part I of this paper
will address historical mergers between criminal procedure and privacy by
considering prior and similar advances in the law regarding law enforcement’s
use of technology and the resulting legal issues. This will include a review of
historical and current constitutional issues, such as law enforcement’s use of
infrared cameras and Tasers. Next, Part II will delve into the historical and
current constitutional issues surrounding law enforcement’s use of aerial
devices and consider the future of drones and other unmanned aerial devices in
the eyes of criminal procedure. In addition, this part will give readers an
overview of what a drone is and current regulations from the Federal Aviation
Administration. In Part III, I will consider the use of “weaponized” drones.
This will first be analyzed in the international context and will be followed by
taking a more specific look into any current United States law or pending

first-state-legalizes-armed-drones-for-cops-thanks-to-a-lobbyist.html [https://perma.cc/5D7M-QU
KY].
8. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. Jan. 13, 2015).
9. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. 2015) (emphasis added).
10. Cava, supra note 4.
11. Rob Garver, North Dakota Police Can Now Legally Use Taser Drones, YAHOO
FINANCE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/north-dakota-police-now-legally-1300
00154.html [https://perma.cc/9W4P-4WV7].
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legislature regarding law enforcement’s use of weaponized drones. Finally,
Part IV will specifically address the State of Missouri. It will examine current
laws and pending legislation in the State of Missouri regarding law
enforcement’s use of drones. This paper will conclude by considering the idea
and the implications of allowing Missouri law enforcement to use weaponized
drones, and how it would affect riot-like situations, such as those seen in
Ferguson.
I. THE MERGING OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND PRIVACY
A.

Fourth Amendment Searches
The Fourth Amendment guarantees:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
12
persons or things to be seized.

Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to redefine what
constitutes an “unreasonable search” as technology develops. Starting in 1967,
in its decision in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court considered how
electronic listening devices affected the Fourth Amendment analysis of
unreasonable searches. 13 In this case, the Court found that the government’s
use of an electronic recording device to eavesdrop on a conversation within a
phone booth was indeed an unreasonable search. 14 The Court returned to this
same question in Kyllo v. United States, where it had to consider the
government’s use of a thermal image scanner to search inside one’s home,
finding once again that it was an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. 15 A critical point of the holding in Kyllo focused on the fact that
the technology used, a thermal imager, was not in general public use, creating
a new test to be applied to the government’s use of technology in considering
whether a search is unconstitutional. 16
However, the Supreme Court was confronted with a separate inquiry when
looking at how the third-party doctrine applies to hidden wires 17 and

12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. 389 U.S. 347, 348–49 (1967).
14. Id. at 353.
15. 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001).
16. Id. at 34.
17. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (finding that the use of a wire is not an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, as there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in what is conveyed to a third party).
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telephones. 18 In the cases dealing with these issues, the Court held consistently
with the third-party doctrine, finding that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in what one conveys to a third party, even if through electronic
measures not in general public use. Significantly, in 2012, the Supreme Court
revived the importance of constitutionally protected areas in regards to new
technology in their decision in United States v. Jones. 19 In Jones, the Court
held that the government’s use of a GPS device on petitioner’s vehicle to
monitor the whereabouts of the vehicle is an unreasonable search, as it is a
“physical intrusion on a constitutionally protected area.” 20 As Justice Alito
writes in his concurrence in Jones, “[n]ew technology may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find
the tradeoff worthwhile.” 21
More recently, the circuits have been presented with constitutional issues
regarding new technology that we may see rising to the Supreme Court. The
Eleventh Circuit considered what privacy exists in the copious information
obtained by cellphone companies in United States v. Davis. 22 While, the
Eleventh Circuit held consistently with the third party doctrine, we are left to
question, when is the information too much and should we limit the amount
that is to become available to the government? 23 Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit was faced with new technology in United States v. Denson, where the
government used a Doppler radar device to sense whether a person was inside
their home. 24 Here, the court chose not to make a decision on whether the use
of a Doppler radar device to peer inside a subject’s home was a Fourth
Amendment violation, but rather opened the door for the Supreme Court by
stating, “[i]t’s obvious to us and everyone else in this case that the
government’s warrantless use of such a powerful tool to search inside homes

18. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the use of a pen register
on petitioner’s phone is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, as there is no
expectation of privacy in the numbers that he conveyed to the third party telephone company).
19. 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012).
20. Id. at 951.
21. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
22. 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding, consistently with Smith, that where
information is voluntarily and knowingly provided to a third party, such as location information
from a cellphone, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy).
23. Id. at 541–43 (Martin, J., dissenting). In the dissent, Justice Martin reflects on the vast
amount of information and need for limits on information given to the government without a
warrant. He is quoted, “I reject a theory that allows the government such expansive access to
information about where we are located, no matter how detailed a picture of our movements the
government may receive.” Id. at 542–43.
24. 775 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2014) (making no decision regarding whether or not
a Doppler radar device capable of detecting from outside the home the presence of a person inside
is a Fourth Amendment violation, as the government had sufficient reason to believe that
someone was inside based on other circumstances).
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poses grave Fourth Amendment questions.” 25 As the court effectively stated in
Denson, “[n]ew technologies bring with them not only new opportunities for
law enforcement to catch criminals but also new risks for abuse and new ways
to invade constitutional rights.” 26
After a review of the Supreme Court cases regarding government’s use of
technology to search our constitutionally protected areas of “persons, houses,
papers and effects,” it is clear that the law is ever changing. 27 Yet, it poses the
question of whether the government’s use of drones for surveillance or
imaging purposes constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 28 Will the
Supreme Court consider them to be technology in “general public use”? 29 Or
will they find that the government’s use of drones is a “physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area”? 30 The Supreme Court anticipates this, as
stated in Denson, “[w]e don’t doubt for a moment that the rise of increasingly
sophisticated and invasive search technologies will invite us to venture down
this way again—and soon.” 31 However, the “unreasonable searches” piece of
the Fourth Amendment is not the only constitutional concern for law
enforcement’s use of drones.
B.

Fourth Amendment: Unreasonable Seizures

A Fourth Amendment seizure of a person occurs when law enforcement
“by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [a
person’s] freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” 32 In its
holding in Brendlin v. California, the Supreme Court puts forth two tests:
physical force and show of authority. 33 A “show of authority” has been defined
as belief by a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave. 34 The Court
has found that a seizure occurs by “physical force” when law enforcement
detains a person, 35 arrests a person, 36 or if they use deadly force to apprehend a
suspect. 37 In order to achieve a detainment or arrest, a police officer has the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1218.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Infra Part II.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2014).
551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Id.; 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968).
Id. at 16.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
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ability to use reasonable force. 38 However, issues arise when police officers
use “excessive force” in their attempts to detain, arrest, or apprehend a suspect,
as this form of physical force may be considered an “unreasonable seizure”
and violation of the Fourth Amendment. 39 Just as seen in regards to the
“search” piece of the Fourth Amendment, there are also various forms of
electronic equipment that have been employed to assist in a “seizure” by law
enforcement.
Among the various ways that police apprehend suspects, it is common
practice for them to use Tasers. 40 While one of the most controversial issues in
criminal justice, police use of Tasers is completely legal. 41 “Police can always
use reasonable, non-deadly force to thwart any crime or to seize anyone the
police officer reasonably believes to be fleeing from the commission of a crime
or attempting to evade a lawful arrest.” 42 Additionally, as held in Tennessee v.
Garner, even if law enforcement’s use of a Taser results in death, it is still
legal if the officer reasonably believed that the suspect posed a threat of serious
injury or death to others. 43 Whether the use of force is reasonable, depends on
the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” 44 These rules apply to
other devices employed by law enforcement, such as bean bag guns, mace and
tear gas. 45 This presents an interesting dynamic to our analysis of law
enforcement’s use of drones. Can law enforcement use drones armed with a
Taser or tear gas to apprehend suspects, as long as the officer “reasonably
believes [a suspect] to be fleeing from the commission of a crime or attempting
to evade a lawful arrest”? 46 Or, will the Court find this use of “armed” drones
to be an “unreasonable seizure” by use of “excessive force”? Moreover, if the
reasonableness is to be judged by the perspective of the officer on the scene,

38. Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, When Does Use of Pepper Spray, Mace, or Other
Similar Chemical Irritants Constitute Violation of Constitutional Rights, 65 A.L.R. 6th 93 (2011).
39. Id.
40. Elizabeth Seals, Police Use of Tasers: The Truth is “Shocking,” 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 109, 112 (2007) (“Tasers are currently used in police departments in every state across the
United States, with the sole exception of New Jersey.”).
41. STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, USE OF TASERS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES: GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2005), http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/
uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/164097/doc/slspublic/Tasersv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3ECG2GW].
42. Id. at 12.
43. Id.
44. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
45. Ralph Vartabedian, Ferguson, Mo., Police are Using a Blunt Instrument – Tear Gas,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-nann-tear-gas-ferguson-08132014-story.html [https://perma.cc/49M8-H85E]. Vartabedian states,
“tear gas was first used more than a century ago, and ever since law enforcement agencies have
been refining their policies for employing it.” Id.
46. STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 41, at 12.
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can an officer truly evaluate the scene by use of a drone? As accurately quoted
by Judge Martin in his dissent in Davis, “[i]f times have changed, reducing
everyman’s scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world . . . the
values served by the Fourth Amendment [are] more, not less, important.” 47
C. Law Enforcement’s Use of Force Within the Fourth Amendment
In certain situations, the police may need to exert certain forms of force. 48
Specifically, force may be necessary in situations of protecting others or selfdefense. 49 There is no universal definition or set of rules for the use of force. 50
Typically, each individual agency will set guidelines for their officers
regarding when officers can use force and how much, but this is not required or
standardized. 51 These guidelines are commonly developed from use of force
continuums, or a model of what scenarios require different forms of force. 52
However, the use of force is determined by the police officer on a case-bycase basis. 53 The International Association of Chiefs of Police has described
use of force as the “amount of effort required by police to compel compliance
by an unwilling subject.” 54 Officers are trained to judge when a crisis requires
force in order to protect oneself and others and regain control over a dangerous
situation. 55 Many times, time is the key variable in determining whether or not

47. U.S. v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)) (alterations in original).
48. Police Use of Force, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nij.gov/top
ics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/8QB5-3S
A3].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT’L. INST. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.nij.
gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/Pages/continuum.aspx [https://perma.cc/3
MRF-8CBG]. Generally, there are five levels in a standard use-of-force continuum. The first level
is “officer presence,” whereby his presence alone and without the use of any force, the officer can
deescalate and regain control over the situation. Second, “verbalization,” is where the officer uses
non-physical force, such as verbal commands to control the situation. Third, if the situation
continues to escalate, the use-of-force rises to “empty-hand control,” allowing the officer to
employ bodily force, such as physically grabbing, holding, or restraining a suspect. Fourth, as the
circumstances begin to become more dangerous, the police officer may now need to employ
“less-lethal methods” to command control, this includes the use of batons, pepper spray, tear gas,
Tasers, and other forms of non-lethal weapons. Finally, if the suspect poses a substantial threat to
the life of the officer or a citizen, the officer may employ “lethal force,” using a deadly weapon,
such as a firearm to seize the suspect indefinitely. Id.
53. Police Use of Force, supra note 48.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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an officer should use force and how much. 56 However, when challenged in the
courts, the Supreme Court has provided a guide. 57
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “what
constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement
officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person.” 58 Regarding this issue, the Court held
that “such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s
‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a substantive due
process standard.” 59 In other words, when officers are confronted with
situations where the use of force may be necessary in order to arrest someone,
or to protect himself or another citizen, the officer must act in the same manner
that a reasonable officer would have acted in a similar, tense, rapidly evolving
situation. 60
The Court continues by stating that “[d]etermining whether the force used
to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment
requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” 61 Further, the Court reminds us “[o]ur Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest
or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” 62 The Court then supplies what
are now known as the Graham factors, which should be employed in
determining whether the use of force is objectively reasonable: (1) “the
severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate

56. Id.
57. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–98 (1989). In Graham, petitioner was a diabetic
and entered a grocery store to purchase an orange juice to help stabilize his sugar levels. Seeing
that the checkout line was long, he left in a hurry, asking his friend to drive him to a friend’s
house. An officer saw his erratic behavior and, thinking he may have committed a crime at the
grocery store, seized him until receiving a report from the store of whether he had committed any
crime. During this seizure, petitioner ran around the car twice and passed out on the curb.
Believing this to be extremely unusual behavior, and believing petitioner to be drunk rather than a
diabetic, the officer called in reinforcements and had petitioner arrested (while he was
unconscious). Even after persistent pleading by his friend to allow petitioner to have sugar, and
once conscious, petitioner begged the officers to check his diabetic card in his wallet, the police
shoved his face into the hood of the car. He was held there until the police received a report of no
wrongdoing at the grocery store. Petitioner “sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised
forehead, and an injured shoulder; he also claims to have developed a loud ringing in his right ear
that continues to this day.” Id. at 388–90.
58. Id. at 388.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 397.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 63 Essentially, this
reasonableness test uses a totality of the circumstances determination.
Some additional considerations the Court provides include, “the
‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation” 64 and “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular
use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 65
This type of analysis as applied to drones would be complex and delicate.
If law enforcement began applying force by administering less-lethal methods,
could an officer truly apply the Graham factors? It begs the question of
whether or not an officer could reasonably evaluate the situation and apply the
correct amount of force. This type of policing could potentially save lives of
officers—or unfairly threaten lives of suspects. Either way, it would likely lead
to an increase in excessive force lawsuits, which would hopefully provide
judicial guidance as to whether law enforcement’s use of drones is legal.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF AERIAL DEVICES AND
DRONES
A.

Supreme Court on Aerial Devices and the Constitution

Although the Supreme Court has not yet offered any opinions regarding
drone use, it has provided a starting point. In the 1986 case of California v.
Ciraolo, the Supreme Court addressed law enforcement’s use of aircrafts when
conducting a Fourth Amendment “search.” 66 In Ciraolo, the Court confirmed
that law enforcement’s use of aerial surveillance on a fixed-wing aircraft in
public navigable airspace to conduct a search does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 67 Chief Justice Burger notes, “[t]he Fourth Amendment simply
does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to
obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.” 68 This
decision was reaffirmed in Florida v. Riley as applied to a helicopter flying at
400 feet overhead, where the Court stated “Riley could not reasonably have
expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation
from a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 396.
476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
Id. at 215.
Id.
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wing aircraft.” 69 Although Ciraolo and Riley seemingly set out a bright line
rule, many courts have interpreted it strictly. 70
In the majority of cases regarding warrantless aerial surveillance, courts
have found the observation to be relatively non-intrusive on one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, thus finding that the surveillance is not a Fourth
Amendment violation. 71 However, there are some situations, where “the means
of surveillance [were] sufficiently intrusive so as to give rise to a constitutional
violation.” 72 In a recent decision by the Supreme Court of the State of New
Mexico, the court cites two cases in which the intrusiveness of the warrantless
aerial search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 73 In the first case,
Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that law
enforcement’s use of a helicopter to perform aerial surveillance of appellee’s
barn from fifty feet above was unconstitutional as it was overly intrusive and
created a risk of harm to appellee and her property. 74 Similarly, in People v.
Pollock, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that aerial surveillance by police
was more intrusive than mere observation because the helicopter (1)
“descended to 200 feet,” (2) “hovered in the area for several minutes,” and (3)
made “enough noise that numerous people ran out” to see what the noise
was. 75
On review of these cases as well as Ciraolo and Riley, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico promotes two conclusions. 76 First, aerial observations of
public navigable airspace are generally permissible under the Fourth
Amendment when they are relatively unobtrusive. 77 However, second, when
the aerial surveillance becomes more than just an observation and creates an
intrusive environment for those on the ground—causing high amounts of wind,
unreasonable amounts of dust and noise, damaging objects, and raising alarm
amongst citizens—the aerial activity rises to a point of an unreasonable
search. 78 Thus, the court holds similarly to Oglialoro and Pollock, and contrary
to Ciraolo and Riley, that prolonged hovering close to the ground, which
causes intrusion onto a citizen’s person and property, is an unreasonable search
and thus requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 79 Overall, the court

69. 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989).
70. Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 579 A.2d 1288, 1294 (Pa. 1990); People v. Pollock, 796
P.2d 63, 65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); New Mexico v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1166 (N.M. 2015).
71. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1170.
72. Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 4:5 (3d ed. 1996).
73. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1170–71.
74. Oglialoro, 579 A.2d at 1294.
75. Pollock, 796 P.2d at 63.
76. Davis, 360 P.3d at 1171.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1172.
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introduces certain factors to take into account when determining when aerial
surveillance is indeed too intrusive. 80 These factors include (1) “the legality of
the flight,” (2) “the altitude of the aircraft,” (3) “the frequency and duration of
the flight,” and (4) “the nature of the area observed.” 81 Although seemingly
reasonable, these factors and determination have yet to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Yet, it seems as if it had an inkling that it may return to this
issue in the future.
The dissent in Ciraolo looks to Justice Harlan’s warning in his concurrence
in Katz, that we must be careful with “future electronic developments and the
potential for electronic interference with private communications.” 82 However,
Chief Justice Burger disputes this by stating,
[o]ne can reasonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft
within the category of future ‘electronic’ developments that could stealthily
intrude upon an individual’s privacy. In an age where private and commercial
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being
83
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.

Yet, this bears the question of whether a drone is to be considered within this
category of concerning “future electronic developments.” The New Mexico
Court of Appeals, which was reversed in Davis, seemed to think this was an
important consideration.
The Court of Appeals in New Mexico advanced that the New Mexico
Constitution should account for law enforcement’s future use of “ultra-quiet
drones” and other high tech devices by moving away from an “intrusion
analysis.” 84 Instead, it proposed this test to determine whether an aerial search
by law enforcement was constitutional:
[I]f law enforcement personnel, via targeted aerial surveillance, have the
purpose to intrude and attempt to obtain information from a protected area,
such as the home or its curtilage, that could not otherwise be obtained without
physical intrusion into that area, that aerial surveillance constitutes a search for
85
purposes of Article II, Section 10.

The New Mexico Supreme Court declined to adopt this provision, or even
comment on drones at all, as it found it “unnecessary to speculate about
problems—and futuristic technology—that may or may not arise in the
future.” 86 However, the future is here and so are drones.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1169.
Davis, 360 P.3d at 1169.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).
Id. at 215.
Davis, 360 P.3d at 1172.
Id. at 1183 (quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1172.
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We next question whether or not it is unreasonable for a United States
citizen to believe that he or she is constitutionally protected from being
observed by a drone flying within navigable airspace. In attempt to answer
some of these questions, we must first establish what is considered to be an
aircraft and whether a drone fits into this category.
B.

Drones and Current Laws Regarding Drones

Drones or domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”) are “autonomous
aerial vehicles that are equipped with cameras or other sensors in order to
collect assorted data from an aerial vantage point.” 87 Whether or not one must
register a drone with the FAA depends on the type of use. 88 If a drone is being
used for personal use, such as for recreation or hobby, the operator does not
need permission by the FAA to fly the UAV. 89 However, there are certain
limitations, including the requirement to register the UAV with the FAA if it
weighs over .55 pounds, it must be flown in non-populous areas, and should
remain within sight of the operator. 90 On the other hand, if the UAV is being
used for public operations, governmental purposes, or for civil operations
(non-governmental business purposes), it requires registration and a certified
operator. 91
When a company or person would like to fly a UAV for a non-personal or
non-governmental purpose, it is considered a “civil aircraft operation” and
must meet FAA regulations. 92 In order to meet these requirements, one must
gain authorization by one of two methods: Section 333 Exemption, 93 or
Special Airworthiness Certificate (SAC). 94 Similarly, if a government entity
(such as a law enforcement agency) wishes to fly a UAV, it must also follow

87. UNIV. OF WASHINGTON TECH. AND PUBLIC POL’Y CLINIC, DOMESTIC DRONES:
TECHNICAL AND PRIVACY ISSUES (2013), http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/technology/re
ports/droneslawandpolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFC6-TH3M].
88. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FAA (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.faa.gov/uas/
[https://perma.cc/G22S-ACJH].
89. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked Questions, FAA (Oct. 7, 2016,
2:35 PM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/36PU-L6EH].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. UVA FAA Civil Operations UAV Regulations: Civil Operations (Non-Governmental),
HOMELAND SURVEILLANCE & ELEC., http://www.hse-uav.com/faa_civil_operations_nongovern
mental.htm [https://perma.cc/5KBD-JC96] (revised Nov. 11, 2016).
93. Id. (“Section 333 Exemption – a grant of exemption in accordance with Section 333
AND a civil Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA); this process may be used to perform
commercial operations in low-risk, controlled environments.”).
94. Id. (“Special Airworthiness Certificate (SAC) – applicants must be able to describe how
their system is designed, constructed, and manufactured, including engineering processes,
software development and control, configuration management, and quality assurance procedures
used, along with how and where they intend to fly.”).
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certain regulations. 95 However, limitations on “public aircraft operations” are
defined by federal statute. 96
Title 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) provides the definition of “public aircraft”
as “an aircraft used only for the United States Government,” and “[a]n aircraft
owned by the Government and operated by any person for purposes related to
crew training, equipment development, or demonstration,” among various
other definitions. 97 42 U.S.C. § 40125 provides the qualifications for public
aircraft status. 98 Under this statute, whether a UAV flight qualifies as “public
aircraft operation” is determined on a “flight-by-flight basis.” 99 In making this
determination, the FAA considers “aircraft ownership, the operator, the
purpose of the flight, and the persons on board the aircraft.” 100 In order for a
public aircraft operation to legally take place, the FAA must issue a Certificate
of Waiver or Authorization, which allows public agencies (including law
enforcement) to operate a UAV for a specified purpose in a specified area. 101
From this overview of current law and procedure regarding UAVs in
public navigable airspace, it is clear that law enforcement may use drones,
given they meet the statutory and administrative regulations. 102 When
interpreting this analysis alongside Ciraolo, with the FAA and United States
Code classification of drones as aircrafts, at least in the context of public
operations, it is likely that these devices would fall within the holding of an
aircraft in public navigable airspace. 103 Thus, under this interpretation of
Ciraolo, law enforcement’s use of drones to operate a “search” within
navigable public airspace would not be a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
unless it is overly intrusive or cause harm to people or property below.
Here, we reach a critical point in the analysis: if law enforcement can use
drones for “searches,” what are the limits on the use of drones for “seizures”?

95. Advisory Circular No: 00-1.1A at 6, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.: U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP.
(Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1_
1A.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GHM-XYY6].
96. Id. at 2, 6(c), (d).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (2012).
98. § 40125. As previously mentioned, law enforcement falls under this category as
described in § 40125(a)(2): “The term ‘governmental function’ means an activity undertaken by a
government, such as national defense, intelligence missions, firefighting, search and rescue, law
enforcement (including transport of prisoners, detainees, and illegal aliens), aeronautical research,
or biological or geological resource management.”
99. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 95, at 8(a).
100. Id. at 6(b).
101. Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (last modified
Aug. 19, 2016, 8:21 AM), https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service
_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa [https://perma.cc/DR72-ULY3].
102. Id.; see also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 95, at 6(a), (c).
103. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
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III. WEAPONIZED DRONES—THE FUTURE OR THE NOW?
A.

International Use of Weaponized Drones

In 2011, headlines broke in The Washington Post and The New York Times
that the United States had built a secret drone base in Saudi Arabia. 104 Even
more alarming were reports of the first lethal mission by the drone base in
September of 2011. 105 Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and alleged alQaida terrorist, was killed by a drone strike in Yemen on September 30,
2011. 106 In 2010, the Obama Administration authorized the targeted killing of
al-Awlaki due to his ties to terrorism. 107 Generally, international law allows a
country to use lethal force against an individual or group if it poses an
imminent threat to that country, which is how al-Awlaki became a “kill or
capture” target of the United States. 108 Al-Awlaki was the first American to be
placed on the CIA’s “kill or capture” list. 109 He was also the first American
citizen to be hunted and killed by the United States government without a trial
since the Civil War. 110 Moreover, he was the only American to be directly
targeted and killed by a government drone. 111 His death poses interesting
constitutional issues, such as al-Awlaki’s right to free speech under the First
Amendment and right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 112
However, could the government defend this action by way of the Fourth
Amendment by claiming that this was a legal and authorized seizure by use of
lethal force due to the threat of serious injury or death to others? How far could
104. Noah Shachtman, Is This the Secret U.S. Drone Base in Saudi Arabia?, WIRED (Feb. 7,
2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/02/secret-drone-base-2/ [https://perma.cc/3WRKF6TB].
105. Id.
106. Jennifer Griffin, Two U.S.-Born Terrorists Killed in CIA-Led Drone Strike, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/30/us-born-terror-boss-anwar-al-aw
laki-killed.html [https://perma.cc/3FQX-56YP].
107. Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html?_r=0 [https://per
ma.cc/7RKA-NPUU].
108. Id.
109. Griffin, supra note 106.
110. Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-aus-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html [perma.c/UU55-F3NS].
111. Adam Taylor, The U.S. Keeps Killing Americans in Drone Strikes, Mostly by Accident,
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/
23/the-u-s-keeps-killing-americans-in-drone-strikes-mostly-by-accident/ [https://perma.cc/JX4RX7HP].
112. Glenn Greenwald, Criminalizing Free Speech: The Administration Now Justifies
Punishing or Even Killing Citizens, Like Anwar al-Awlaki, Because of Their Ideas, SALON (June
1, 2011, 3:02 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/06/01/free_speech_4/ [https://perma.cc/233P-NB
KC].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF WEAPONIZED DRONES

365

this theory be extended within our everyday society? How close to home are
these weaponized drones? To answer these questions, we must take a historic
look at the rise of weaponized drones internationally.
Although there are numerous companies that are manufactures and
providers of UAVs, there are some companies that specialize in modifying
drones in order to equip them with various weapons. 113 For example, Desert
Wolf, a South African company, has designed a drone that is able to administer
pepper spray and non-lethal paintballs on individuals or crowds. 114 The
purpose of these weaponized drones are to “contain ‘unruly crowds’ and
‘violent protests.’” 115 This drone, called the Skunk Copter, is equipped with
four “high-capacity gun barrels,” each of which is capable of firing up to
“4,000 paintballs, pepper spray balls and solid plastic balls at rates of up to 80
balls per second.” 116 This company is providing these drones to customers
within South Africa as well as customers in countries outside of South
Africa. 117 Clients include security companies, police forces, and numerous
other industrial customers. 118
A law enforcement agency in Lucknow, India, has already begun
experimenting with weaponized drones. 119 In order to keep control over rowdy
crowds and mobs, the police have begun equipping drones with pepper
spray. 120 Lucknow’s police chief has been quoted saying “[w]e are planning to
use these drones to control unruly mobs by showering them with pepper
spray.” 121 According to The Indian Express, this police force has already
purchased a fleet of drones that can lift up almost four and a half pounds. 122 In
other parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, where the military controls the
airspace, weaponized military UAVs are already being used in civilian
airspace. 123

113. Riot Control Drone Armed with Paintballs and Pepper Spray Hits Market, RT NEWS
(June 19, 2014, 23:42), https://www.rt.com/news/167168-riot-control-pepper-spray-drone/
[https://perma.cc/39A7-RM53].
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. RT NEWS, supra note 113.
119. Wochit News, Police to Use Pepper-Spraying Drone on Crowds in India, YOUTUBE
(Apr. 9, 2015), https://youtu.be/JTJutZuimso [https://perma.cc/Y8EV-5EDM].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Jessica Elgot, Police Drones: Unmanned Air Vehicles Could Monitor Protests, Riots and
Traffic in UK, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/
2012/10/01/police-drones-unmanned-air-protests-uk-riot-traffic_n_1928339.html [https://perma.
cc/NYB8-9B4P].
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Further, in the United Kingdom, the Police Minister has endorsed the use
of drones “to patrol the UK’s skies, to monitor criminal activity and provide air
support, saying they should be treated like ‘any other piece of police kit.’” 124
However, the Police Minister notes that due to the already crowded airspace by
civil and military aircrafts, the use of police drones would likely take a while to
get approved. 125 But, once restrictions are lifted, he envisions them having
every right that is afforded to a police helicopter. 126 Yet, the use of drones by
law enforcement is not only an international operation.
Police use of drones is much closer to home than one may think. In 2015,
forty-five of the fifty states considered legislation regarding drones. 127 The
majority of the bills were aimed at protecting privacy by restricting the use of
drones for unwarranted surveillance. 128 Although many state legislatures are
trying to keep up with technology, it seems as if the government agencies may
be a few steps ahead. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, as of
2013, at least fifteen states have law enforcement agencies that have either
applied for drone authorization from the Federal Aviation Administration or
have borrowed drones from the Customs and Border Protections for special
operations. 129 Additionally, we have seen the rise in legislation regarding the
use of weaponized drones within the United States. 130 In both South Carolina
and Tennessee, bills have been proposed which prohibit the equipping of
privately owned UAVs with any form of weapon. 131 However, this does not
apply to government agencies, thus providing a loophole for drones utilized by
police to be equipped with lethal and non-lethal weapons. 132 Although many

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Eric Adler, That Buzz in the Air? Drones of Christmas, Coming to Skies Near You,
KANSAS CITY STAR (Dec. 5, 2015, 3:21 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/technolo
gy/article48196290.html [https://perma.cc/7DFR-4639].
128. Id.
129. Law Enforcement Agencies Using Drones List, Map, GOVERNING (2013),
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/drones-state-local-law-enforcement-agencieslicense-list.html [https://perma.cc/Y5Q4-6MGW]. The fifteen states include Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, Utah, California, Arizona, Colorado, Texas, North Dakota, Minnesota, Ohio, Arkansas,
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Id.
130. Joe Wolverton, Tennessee, South Carolina Could “Green Light” Weaponized Police
Drones, THE NEW AMERICAN (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitu
tion/item/22238-tennessee-south-carolina-could-green-light-weaponized-police-drones
[https://perma.cc/8WH8-6NKF].
131. Id.
132. Id. In Tennessee, the proposed legislation, HB 1456, had the purpose of “creat[ing] [a]
Class E felony of attaching a weapon to an unmanned aircraft.” This bill has since been
withdrawn. H. 1456, 109th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016). The South Carolina bill,
HB 4425, was introduced for the purpose of “provid[ing] that it is unlawful to operate an
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believe the likelihood of these types of bills being passed is low, a bill of this
nature has already been enacted—in North Dakota. 133 So, what does this mean
for Missouri?
IV. MISSOURI LEGISLATION AND DRONES
A.

Legislation in the State of Missouri Regarding Law Enforcement’s Use of
Drones

Since 2013, three bills have been proposed in Missouri attempting to
restrict the use of drones. 134 Missouri House Bill 46, which is now dead, was
proposed with the purpose to “prohibit[] the use of a drone or other aircraft to
gather evidence or other information with specified exceptions.” 135 This bill
proposed three restrictions to the use of drones. 136 First, it restricts anyone,
including government agencies and law enforcement from using a drone to
conduct any type of surveillance regarding potential criminal activity without a
warrant. 137 Second, it restricts all users of unmanned aerial devices from flying
and using the device for conducting surveillance under the “doctrine of open
fields” without consent of the landowner. 138 Finally, it places a broad
restriction on anyone, including journalists or news organizations, from using
drones to conduct surveillance over any private property without the consent of
the landowner. 139 It does, however, provide an exception for law enforcement,
allowing them to use a drone if exigent circumstances exist, such as when “a
law enforcement agency possesses reasonable suspicion that, under particular
circumstances, swift action to prevent imminent danger to life is necessary.” 140
Although no bills regarding drones or unmanned aircrafts have been passed yet
in Missouri, it is safe to say that we have not seen the last of these types of
legislation, as there are many proponents and critics on each side.

unpiloted aerial vehicle that is armed with a weapon, and to provide a penalty.” It has since been
referred to a House committee. H. 4425, 121st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015).
133. H. 1328, 2015 Leg., 64th Sess. (N.D. 2015).
134. Adler, supra note 127.
135. H. 46, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. H. 46, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
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Implications of Allowing Missouri Law Enforcement to Use Weaponized
Drones

One of St. Louis’s largest proponents of law enforcement’s use of drones is
Chief of Police, Sam Dotson, who is working to make it happen. 141 Dotson has
already requested allowance from the Federal Aviation Administration for St.
Louis Police Department to use drones. 142 Among other reasons, Dotson
envisions using drones in St. Louis to circle Busch Stadium to scan for
terrorists or pursue a suspect in a car chase. 143 He endorses his position by
stating “[i]f we are serious about crime reduction strategies, we must look to
new technologies which help keep officers and the public safe and apprehend
criminals.” 144 Former St. Louis Circuit Attorney, Jennifer Joyce, is also an
enthusiastic supporter of the St. Louis police force’s use of drones. 145 Although
Dotson, Joyce, and even St. Louis City Mayor, Francis Slay, see this as a safer
way to apprehend suspects, others see it as a constitutional abuse. 146
Jeffrey Mittman, Executive Director of American Civil Liberties Union of
Eastern Missouri, sees this as “a significant expansion of government
surveillance.” 147 He argues that “[o]ur laws have not kept up with our privacy
rights. Our Fourth Amendment privacy rights aren’t safe from unreasonable
search and seizure when you’re looking at drones.” 148 Even though Dotson’s
petition to the FAA was for drones merely armed with cameras and no other
lethal or non-lethal devices, it raises suspicion as to how long it would take
until this changed. 149 These concerns regarding law enforcement’s use of
weaponized drones in the St. Louis area stems from what was seen in
Ferguson, Missouri in 2014. 150
Anyone who turned on the news on August 9, 2014 could have reasonably
believed he or she was watching footage of a combat zone, rather than the

141. Christine Byers, St. Louis Police Chief Wants Drones to Monitor City from the Sky, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Jun. 23, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/stlouis-police-chief-wants-drones-to-monitor-city-from/article_1f0a7488-855d-52cf-9590-03129ce
48a06.html [https://perma.cc/4LM8-C49U].
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Byers, supra note 141.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Kylie Bourne, Police Militarization Takes Off With Weaponized Drones, DISCOVER
MAGAZINE: DRONE 360 (Sept. 14, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/drone360/
2015/09/14/police-militarization-weaponized-drones/#.VwHDd3gQpUR [https://perma.cc/3GQY
-RSHE].
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streets of Ferguson, Missouri. 151 During the protests surrounding the death of
Michael Brown, Ferguson Police lined the streets in riot gear and militarized
equipment. 152 Amongst other tactics, the police deployed copious amounts of
tear gas on protestors without warning. 153 These militarized police tactics have
led to public outcry, as well as lawsuits filed. 154 These suits, filed against three
Missouri police agencies, have settled, requiring that police warn protestors
before deploying tear gas and allowing them to disperse, unless the harm is
truly imminent. 155 However, many questions and concerns plague this nation
in regards to the law enforcement’s use of drones in similar riot-like situations.
How would these regulations apply to drones? Could a drone administer
tear gas or other invasive forms of crowd control? Is it likely that we could see
drones used in a manner similar to that of Lucknow, India? Is it reasonable to
believe that police could properly provide warning for protestors to disperse
when they are operating from a distance with drones? Could a police officer
reasonably assess whether or not harm is truly imminent from a drone? In an
area, such as St. Louis, which has seen a fair share of dangerous unrest and a
police force that responds in a militarized fashion, law enforcement’s use of
drones, weaponized or not, is a realm of hot debate.
CONCLUSION
There are two sides to every debate, and the debate regarding law
enforcement’s use of weaponized drones is not unlike any other. Proponents to
the police’s use of drones see this as a way to protect our men and women in
blue. Critics of law enforcement’s use of weaponized drones see it as an
unsettling step in the direction of overly-militarized police forces and possible
violations of our constitutional rights. As simply stated, “[t]he balance is
between a technology that potentially can have a lot of private and public
benefit along with some very real privacy and safety concerns.” 156
However, this paper can boil down to a single question—if law
enforcement can use non-lethal weapons to seize a suspect, why can’t they use
a drone armed with a non-lethal weapon to do the same? I argue that under
Graham, when assessing the reasonableness of a particular use of force, such
as tear gas dispersed from a drone, it will likely cause an issue as to whether
151. Terry Goldsworthy, Urban Combat: Ferguson and the Militarisation of Police, THE
CONSERVATION (Aug. 18, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://theconversation.com/urban-combat-fergusonand-the-militarisation-of-police-30568 [https://perma.cc/KQ53-GS2L].
152. Id.
153. Sarah Begley, Missouri Police Will Restrict Tear Gas After Ferguson Lawsuit, TIME
(Mar. 27, 2015), http://time.com/3761460/missouri-police-restrict-tear-gas/ [https://perma.cc/53
JB-4LX3].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Adler, supra note 127.
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the officer could truly assess the situation and administer the proper amount of
force. As we see more and more legislation passed allowing law enforcement
agencies to use weaponized drones, we will likely be faced with an increase in
excessive force lawsuits. As the ACLU wrote in an article criticizing the North
Dakota bill allowing law enforcement to arm drones with non-lethal weapons,
“[d]rones make it too easy to use force.” 157 It can be argued that these kinds of
bills “open the door to increasing weaponization,” and “increase the
militarization of police.” 158 This is exactly what we saw in Ferguson, and what
many are afraid of seeing again—even if only from the eye of a drone.
AMANDA A. PORTER *

157. Jay Stanley, Five Reasons Armed Domestic Drones are a Terrible Idea, ACLU (Aug. 27,
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